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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Suit by American Savings & Loan to Foreclose a real 
estate mortgage on residence of Wayne T. & Ruth E. 
Blomquist. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Court discharged jury without hearing evidence and 
awarded judgment of foreclosure of said mortgage in the 
nature of summary judgment or judgment on the plead-
ings. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Blomquists seek an order determining that Resp ,. 
OnJe,: 
was not entitled to accelerate the unpaid mortgag d '', 
e er,, 
balance at the time that it purported to do so or · , · 
m .h. 
alternative for a new trial with a jury. · 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants are indebted to Respondent on a note anl 
mortgage (Exhibits P-1 and P-2). Appellants were late 
in making most of the payments due on that loan and 
late charges of $5.94 per late payment were assessed. Ir: 
addition to the monthly payment on principal and \L-
terest of the note, appellants were required to pay 3 
monthly installment to Respondent to be accumulatei 
for payment of property taxes and insurance on the mo::'t-
gaged premises. Respondent increased the escrow fund 
payment by $2.00 effective December 15, 1963, but Ap-
pellants disputed their right to increase payments and 
failed to increase their remittal by this $2.00. 
Appellants also disputed Respondent's right to assess 
a late charge and failed to remit late charges during ap-
proximately the last year. On December 14, 1964 Re-
spondent made demand upon Appellants to pay the fol-
lowing amounts (Exhibit P-4): 
November 15 payment 
11 payments short at $2.00 (Escrow) 






In that letter Respondent stated that it would not accept 
a partial payment and that if payment were made after 
3 
December 25, 1964 that it would be necessary to include 
the December 15, 1964 payment. 
On December 21, 1964 (R. 132) Appellants tendered 
~Hi.00 to Respondent (Exhibit D-8) (R. 130-131) in 
payment of the $118. 75 principal and interest due on 
November 15, 1964, and in payment of all but $2.00 of 
the amount that should have been paid into the escrow 
fund with the November payment, but Appellants did 
:iot include a tender of the $22.00 prior underpayments 
t.o the escrow fund or the $83.16 late charges that had 
been demanded by Respondent. (Exhibit P-4). 
On December 28, 1964 Respondent rejected the tender 
and returned that check with a letter (Exhibit P-5) 
wherein it, in effect, indicated that the tender was re-
jected because it did not include the escrow fund under-
payments and late charges demanded in its letter of 
December 14, 1964 (Exhibit P-4). In the letter of De-
cember 28, 1964 (Exhibit P-5) Respondent stated that 
it would waive late charges on the December 15, 1964 
payment (which was then also past due) if it were paid 
at that time. Respondent did not in that letter refuse the 
tender because the December 15, 1964 payment had not 
been included as contended by counsel. (R. 131) Nothing 
was said in that letter which would in any manner put 
Appellants upon notice that Respondent was even con-
sidering declaring the entire balance of the note to be 
due. 
Appellant again tendered the $147.00 check (Exhibit 
D-8) to Respondent about January 6, 196~ which tender 
was again rejected by a letter of January 6, 196$° (Ex-
4 
hibit P-6) wherein Respondent made reference t . 
d ( o ono, correspon ence Ex P-4 & P-5) and reJ· ected th ' . 
e tenat:· 
because the amount was less than had been de , · 
ma1iue·1 In that letter Respondent also assessed a late ch · 
arge er 
the December 15, 1964 payment and in effect den 
' , 1ancte 
payment of the following amounts: 
November 15 payment 
December 15 payment 
11 payments short at $2.00 (escrow) 







Nothing was said in that letter about accelerating th~ 
balance due on the note. Respondent stated in that lette' 
that the amount demanded " ... must reach our office 
immediately if additional expense and inconvenience are 
to be eliminated." 
Appellant again tendered the $147.00 check (Exhibit 
D-8) about January 8, 1965, which tender was rejected 
by Respondents through their letter of January 8, 1965 
from their attorney (Exhibit P-7) wherein Respondent 
declared the full amount of the mortgage debt due and 
payable. 
About January 14, 1965 Appellants tendered an 
amount in the excess of the amount demanded by Re· 
spondent in the letter of January 6, 1965, which tender 
was rejected by Respondent (Exhibit D-9). About Jan· 
uary 21, 1965 and February 3, 1965 Appellants tendered 
all amounts demanded by Respondents in their letter 
of January 6, 1965 plus the January payment, which ten-
5 
ders were also rejected by Respondents (Exhibit D-10 
and D-12 l. 
On or about January 23, 1965, Appellants received a 
demand from Respondent for payment of $409.16 due as 
ot December 15, 1964 including late charges (Exhibit 
D-l U, (R. 127-128). Respondents dispute the date that 
said notice was received. (R. 127-128). 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE JURY AND 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF FORECLOS-
URE 
After extensive pre-trial hearings before Judge Elton 
and a demand by Appellants for trial by jury the case 
was set by Judge Elton for jury trial. The morning of the 
trial after the jury was in the court room and defendants 
were ready to proceed with their evidence the Court dis-
missed the jury and granted summary judgment of fore-
closure against Defendants without permitting Defend-
ants to present evidence. (R 117). Several substantial 
factual issues remained which should have been sub-
mitted to the jury, which if resolved in favor of Defend-
ants would have resulted in a judgment in favor of De-
fendants, including the following: 
1. Whether the check dated December 21, 1964 (Ex-
hibit D-8) was tendered prior to or after the 25th day of 
December, 1964. If the tender were made prior to that 
date as contended by Appellants (R. 132) then the tender 
would not be insufficient because the 10 day grace period 
on the December 15, 1964 payment had not then passed. 
6 
Respondents contend that this tender was rejected be 
cause the December 15, 1964 payment was not t d · 
en ere< 
(R. 131). This is an issue of fact that should hav 1. · · e uee·· submitted to the jury. .. 
2. In the amende~ pre-trial order (R. 77, Par. 3) the 
Court set up as an issue of fact to be determined bv, ,, 
. . • 1h, 
Jury the issue as to whether the Respondent by its letter 
of December 14, 1964 (Ex. P-4) waived any existincr -i • 
0 lit-
fault by Appellants and was therefore not entitled ; 
accelerate the note and demand payment in full as it at~ 
tempted to do on January 8, 1965 (Exhibit P-7). After 
that waiver no new default occurred which would entitl? 
Respondent to accelerate the note. The jury could well 
have found that Respondent had by its letter of Decembe.· 
14, 1964 (Exhibit P-4) elected to collect a late charge by 
reason of the late payment for November, 1964, and tha: 
accordingly any attempt to accelerate was premature 
That letter expressly states the Respondent had electec 
to collect a late charge and had not then elected to ac-
celerate. It further states that it would not be necessary 
to include the December 15, 1964 payment unless pay-
ment was made after December 25, 1964. The pre-trial 
order determined the issues to be tried by the jury. The 
Court erred in refusing to submit those issues to the jury 
and in refusing to permit Appellants to present evidence 
in support thereof. 
3. Whether or not the letters sent to Appellants by 
Respondents (Exhibit P-4 of December 14, 1964; Exhibit 
P-5 of December 28, 1964; and Exhibit P-6 of January 6, 
1964) gave Appellants reasonable notice of intent not to 
continue to accept late payments, charging only a late 
7 
charge for the delinquency, and of their intent to sud-
denly shift their position by accelerating the note and 
mortgage balance. The jury could well have found from 
those letters and other evidence that Respondent failed 
to give reasonable notice to Appellants and therefore 
had no right to accelerate after toleration of delinquent 
payments over such a long period of time. Pacific De-
1:elopment Company v. Stewart (1948 Ut.) 195 P.2d. 748; 
Ashback v. Wenzel (1959) 141 Colo. 35, 346 P2d. 295; 
Edwards v. Smith ( 1959, Mo.) 322 S.W.2d. 770; Scelza 
v Ryba (1957) 10 Misc. 2d. 186, 169 N.Y.S. 2d, 462; Brown 
,. Hewitt (1940 Tex. Civ. App.) 143 S.W.2d. 223. See 
iurther 97 A.L.R. 2d. 1006 - 1008. 
In the Brown v. Hewitt case cited above the court held 
that where plaintiff had, for 14 consecutive months, ac- , 
cepted from defendant overdue installments on a note 
plaintiff would not be permitted suddenly to revert to 
the terms of the note so as to enforce an optional acceler-
ation clause, based on a subsequent installment which 
was paid 4 days late, without first giving defendant spe-
cific notice of his intention. 
The Utah Supreme Court has reached exactly the same 
conclusion in Pacific Development Company v. Stewart. 
195 P.2d. 748. Justice Pratt, speaking for the court stated 
on page 750 as follows: "There is no question that the 
acceptance by the seller of buyers' past due payments 
and its other conduct toward the buyers leading the latter 
to believe that strict performance would not be required 
by the seller, imposes upon the seller the duty of giving 
to the buyer a reasonable notice before it may insist on 
strict performance by the buyers." 
8 
And in Brown v. Chowchilla Land Co. 59 Cal A 
. , . pc 
164, 210 P. 424 at page 427, the California court tai : 
"The requirement of notice after the receipt 
0
; 0;:~. 
due payments without objection is based upon thee ; 
bl 'd · h quJ a e cons1 erat10n t at by his conduct the vendor h 
1 as eo 
the vendee into the belief that the former will continu: 
to waive the strict performance of the contract." · c 
The import of all of the above (and the case law ;'. 
explicit on this point) is that where the vendor n~' 
waived strict performance of one or more of the pro: 
visions of the contract, he must give reasonable notice 
of his intention to change his position before insistin~ 
upon strict performance in the future, at least as to thos~ 
provisions where he has waived strict performance '.n 
the past. 
A careful examination of Exhibits P-4, P-5, and P-6 
fails to disclose any indication or notice to Appellants 
that Respondent intended to shift its position by sudden-
ly refusing late payments and declaring the entire 
balance to be due. 
4. The jury may well have found that the demand 
made by Respondent on or about January 22, 1965 for 
payment of the December 15, 1964 payment with a late 
charge (Exhibit D-11) constituted a waiver by respond· 
ent of the acceleration of the note and mortgage balance 
demanded and elected in the letter of January 8, 1965 
(Exhibit P-7), and accordingly that subsequent tenders 
made by Appellants (Exhibits D-9, D-10 and D-12) pre· 
vented acceleration of the mortgage balance by Respond· 
ent. 
9 
,~ppellants are entitled to a trial by jury of the issues 
rit fact as a matter of law. 78-21-1 and 78-21-2, UCA, 1953. 
Huiland \". Wilson, 8 U.2d 11, 327 P.2d 250; Finlayson v. 
B:·ady, 121 U.204, 240 P.2d 491. Judge Elton himself ruled 
al ume of pretrial that at least one issue of fact remained 
,,) be determined by a jury and ordered that a jury be 
tm pr.nneled to hear the case (R. 77). Judge Hanson 
Jre':iously determined that the case should be heard by 
~ .iury and ordered a jury trial (R. 64). 
The decision by Judge Elton that no issues of fact re-
;r,ained to be resolved by a jury (R. 117) and to decide 
the case as a matter of law constitutes, in effect, a sum-
man judgment. Accordingly Appellants are entitled for 
µurposes of this appeal to have the court survey the 
e'.'idence and all reasonable 'inferences' fairly to be 
drciwn therefrom in the light most favorable to them. 
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 U.2d. 30, 395 P.2d. 62. 
The party in whose favor a summary judgment is granted 
must establish facts such as to preclude all reasonable 
possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, produce 
evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in 
his favor. Green v. Garn, 11 U. (2d) 375, 359 P.2d 1050. 
The appellant from a summary judgment is entitled to 
have all of the evidence and every inference fairly to 
be derived therefrom resolved in his favor in the ap-
pellate courts. Richard v. Anderson, 9 U(2d) 17, 19, 337 
P.2d 59. 
It appears obvious that the jury, if permitted to do so, 
could well have found the facts to sustain the position of 
Appellants on one or more of the foregoing issues which 
would have entitled Appellants to win. Accordingly the 
10 
case should be remanded to the District Court fo 
. . r a ne··· trial before a Jury. · 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARy 
JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE 
The actions by the Court in discharging the jurv d • an 
deciding the issues in the case without hearing evidencP 
or testimony (other than the matters stipulated up on 
between the parties) constitutes summary judgment ir. 
favor of Respondent. Accordingly all disputed issues 
0
; 
fact should for purposes of this appeal be considered :n 
manner most favorable to Appellant and all proffers oi 
proof should for purposes of this appeal be considered as 
established and proven facts. Thompson v Ford Motor 
Co., 16 U. 2d. 30, 395 P.2d. 62; Green v. Garn, 11 U.2d. 
375, 359 P.2d. 1050; Richard v. Anderson, 9 U.2d. 17 19 
' ' 337 P.2d. 59. 
Acceleration of the entire unpaid balance due on the 
note and mortgage is a harsh remedy and should not be 
permitted unless the right to do so is clearly established 
under the terms of the agreements between the parties. 
If Respondent's judgment is to stand it must be by a 
clear showing that Appellants were guilty of a de· 
fault under the express terms of the note or mortgage, 
and that said default had not been waived. If Respond· 
ents cannot establish that a right to accelerate in fact 
existed on January 9, 1965 then it must fail and the judg· 
ment of foreclosure must be set aside and a new trial 
ordered. An examination of the Appellants purported 
defaults shows that no default in fact existed which under 
11 
the terms of the note and mortgage authorized an accel-
eration of the unpaid balance. The defaults claimed by 
Respondent are as follows: 
:: Failure to pay late charges. (R. 131; Exhibits P-4, 
i'-J and P-6). The note (Exhibit P-1) does provide for a 
:ate charge but does not provide for acceleration of the 
.uipaid note balance for failure to pay late charges. Ac-
·:·1)rdingly failure to pay late charges did not give Re-
~pondents a right to accelerate the unpaid note and mort-
gage balance. 
2. Failure to pay full amount into reserve for taxes and 
i)J,;urance. The note (Exhibit P-1) does not require pay-
·nent of any amounts into the escrow account but simply 
calls for payment of $118. 75 principal and interest. The 
mortgage (Exhibit P-2) does require payment into an 
escrow account for payment of taxes and insurance. The 
mortgage further requires payment of taxes and insur-
ance by Appellants and provides that if Appellants fail to 
pay promptly all taxes, assessments, liens, etc. that may 
accrue against the property, or for repairs to protect the 
property, or to pay the insurance premiums, that the 
Respondent may pay said amounts, demand repayment 
from Appellants and that the money paid therefor by 
Respondent then is secured by the mortgage. The mort-
gage further provides that Respondent can accelerate 
its mortgage balance in the event that Appellants default 
in the payment of money secured by the mortgage or 
the payment of taxes or assessments. Accordingly non-
payment of money into the escrow fund is not a default 
that would entitle Respondents to accelerate the unpaid 
balance of the mortgage debt. It is not until Appellants 
12 
have defaulted in the actual payment of taxes 
or repai· 
ment after demand of money actually expended b . · · 
d t . f 1 Re. spon en s m payment o taxes or insurance that 
spondents would be entitled to accelerate the m t Re. 
or gage 
balance. Respondent stipulated that no demand w'., 
made by it for repayment of taxes and insurance paid ~,:. 
Respondent after said payments had been made (R i 34 ; 
Accordingly payment by Respondent of taxes and insur. 
ance (which payment appears to have been made after 
the attempted acceleration of the unpaid mortgage 
balance and accordingly is immaterial to issues in this 
case) does not constitute grounds for acceleration be-
cause of failure to demand repayment. Failure to pay the 
disputed $2.00 per month into the reserve account is not 
grounds for acceleration under the terms of the note and 
mortgage. In any event no evidence was presented to 
show that under the terms of the mortgage Respondent 
was in fact entitled to increase the escrow payments by 
said disputed $2.00 per month. 
In the case of Homeowners Loan Corp. v. Washington 
108 U. 469, 161 P2d 355 this court was met with a similar 
situation and held that where a note and mortgage re-
quired payment by the mortgagee of taxes and assess· 
ments and demand for repayment before it could declare 
a forfeiture, that a mortgagee which failed to comply 
with that provision was not in a position to declare the 
entire sum due. Respondents simply have failed to make 
the required payment of taxes and insurance and to de-
mand repayment (see stipulation by counsel for Respond-
ents - R. 120) and cannot accelerate the unpaid mortgage 
loan because of non-payment of taxes or insurance. If 
13 
RL·siwnclent intends to rely upon rights created under 
the terms of the note and mortgage it must comply with 
tlic 'cimS of those instruments to create those rights. 
:) F,nlure to tender December 15, 1964 payment with 
i Ii<: µc,;ment of December 21, 1964 (Exhibit D-8). In the 
lei te: of December 14, 1964 (Exhibit P-4) Respondents 
"laled that the December 15, 1964 payment need not be 
bidered with the November 15, 1964 payment unless it 
\\as paid after December 25, 1964. Accordingly the tender 
nf December 21, 1964 was not insufficient by reason of 
the non-tender of the December 15, 1964 payment. Under 
the provisions of 78-27-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
!iespondent \vaived its right to object to the purported 
1nsufficiency of the December 21, 1964 tender by failing 
,o inclade a demand therefor or to raise any additional 
ioJections in the letter of rejection. 78-27-3 reads as 
foLlows: 
"Objection to Tender-Must be specified or deemed 
waived.-The person to whom a tender is made must, 
at the time, specify any objection he may have to 
the money, instrument or property, or he is deemed 
to have waived it; and, if the objection is to the 
amount of money, the terms of the instrument or 
the amount or kind of property, he must specify the 
amounts, terms or kind which he requires, or be 
precluded from objection afterwards." 
4. The amount tendered exceeded the amount due on 
the note. The $147.00 tendered (Exhibit D-8) was ten-
dered in payment of the $118.75 principal and interest 
due under the terms of the promissory note (Ex. P-1) 
with the balance to be credited to the escrow account 
14 
(R. 130-131). Accordingly this tender cut off a . 
th t ny righ· 
a may have theretofore existed for Respondent t' 
accelerate the mortgage debt balance. 0 
5. December 15, 1964 payment was not in def 1 . au tat ~ime of acceleration. Under.the terms of the note default 
m payment of a monthly mstallment did not give Re-
spondent a right to accelerate until payment was more 
than one month past due. (Ex. P-1). Accordingly Re-
spondents cannot rely upon any rights to accelerate 
created by non-payment of December 15, 1964 install. 
ment because those rights had not yet accrued. 
6. Respondent waived its right to accelerate mortgaae 
balance for non-payment of November 15, 1964 payme~t: 
Respondent is also estopped to claim a right to acceler-
ate by reason of non-payment of the November 15, 1964 
payment by December 15, 1964 as is clearly shown by the 
contents of the letters of December 14, 1964 (Ex. P-4), 
December 28, 1964 (Ex. P-5) and January 6, 1965 (Ex. 
P-6) wherein Respondent elected to charge a late charge 
and made no mention of acceleration of the mortgage 
debt balance. Th~ e}{press terms of the promissory note 
specify that failure to exercise the option to accelerate 
shall not constitute a waiver of the right to exercise that 
option in the event of a "subsequent" default. Having 
waived its right to declare an acceleration by reason of 
the November 15, 1964 payment by electing to accept a 
late charge as shown by said letters precludes Respond· 
ents by the express terms of said promissory note from 
declaring an acceleration except in the event of a "sub-
sequent'' default. The December 15, 1964 payment was 
not in default the requisite month required by the ex· 
15 
;:i:·e."s terms of said promissory note (Ex. P-1) and ac-
;.ccdingly was not a "subsequent" default which would 
c'i\itlc Respondents to accelerate the mortgage debt 
11 ~,;ance. Having elected to demand payment of the late 
charges. :mderpayments into the escrow fund and of the 
;\o\·ember 15, 1964 payment the Respondent was not en-
titled to rely on those purported defaults to declare the 
rnnrt;age debt due, but was required to wait for a "sub-
sequent'' default before it could accelerate said debt. Re-
sprmdent failed to do so and its right to accelerate was 
clearlY cut off by the tenders mentioned in exhibits D-9 
v ' 
D-10 and D-12. 
':. Respondent waived its purported acceleration by 
the subsequent demand for payment of the December 15, 
1964 balance with a late charge. 
For purposes of this appeal and by reason of the sum-
mary nature of the proceedings, the evidence must be 
viewed most favorably to Appellant. Accordingly we 
must assume that Appellant's contentions that he re-
ceived a demand for payment of the December 15, 1964 
payment together with a demand for payment of a late 
charge from Respondent on or about January 23, 1965 (R. 
127-128) is true. 
Appellants complied with this demand, and in fact 
tendered amounts in excess of the amounts requested but 
their tenders were refused. (Ex. D-9, D-10 and D-12). 
That demand constituted a waiver by Respondent of 
any rights that it may have acquired by its letter of Jan-
uary 8, 1965 (Ex. P -7) and the later tenders by Appel-
lants cut off any further right to accelerate. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
The minor dispute that arose between the pan·· 
. ies cor.. 
cernmg payment of late charges and the right of Re-
spondent to increase the escrow payment for taxes ar.i 
insurance by $2.00 per month does not justify the har,J; 
remedy of declaring the entire mortgage due withou· 
notice by Respondent. This remedy is in the nature · . 
01 u 
forfeiture and should not be permitted unless the righ'. 
to do so is clear under the terms of the instruments. w P 
feel that under the facts no default in fact existed wb:ch 
would entitle Respondents to accelerate the mortgage 
debt at the time that Respondent attempted to do so. Re-
spondent's refusal of tenders, including tenders by Ap-
pellants of all amounts claimed by Respondents as soon 
as Appellants learned that Respondent intended to shift 
its long established procedure and to accelerate the debt 
illustrates that tempers rather than reason created this 
problem. Appellants have been deprived of their day in 
court and their right to trial by jury of the issues of fact 
involved in this matter. To require Respondents to rein-
state the mortgage loan and to permit Appellants to pay 
that loan over a period of years as the parties originally 
agreed would do justice to all parties. Appellants are en· 
titled, in view of the summary nature of the proceedings 
that resulted in judgment against Appellants, to have all 
evidence considered in the manner most favorable to 
them. Applying this rule it is clear that Appellants are 
17 
e:itded to have the judgment vacated and set aside, and 
rhci r loan reinstated, or that failing, to a new trial be-
[, re ~1 jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorney for Defendants-
Appellants 
2870 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Telephone 486-9636 
